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 NASA STI Program ... in Profile 
 
 
Since its founding, NASA has been dedicated  
to the advancement of aeronautics and space 
science. The NASA scientific and technical 
information (STI) program plays a key part in 
helping NASA maintain this important role. 
 
The NASA STI program operates under the 
auspices of the Agency Chief Information Officer. 
It collects, organizes, provides for archiving, and 
disseminates NASA’s STI. The NASA STI 
program provides access to the NTRS Registered 
and its public interface, the NASA Technical 
Reports Server, thus providing one of the largest 
collections of aeronautical and space science STI 
in the world. Results are published in both 
non-NASA channels and by NASA in the NASA 
STI Report Series, which includes the following 
report types: 
 
TECHNICAL PUBLICATION. Reports of 
completed research or a major significant 
phase of research that present the results of 
NASA Programs and include extensive data 
or theoretical analysis. Includes compila- 
tions of significant scientific and technical 
data and information deemed to be of 
continuing reference value. NASA 
counter-part of peer-reviewed formal 
professional papers but has less stringent 
limitations on manuscript length and extent of 
graphic presentations. 
 
TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM.  
Scientific and technical findings that are 
preliminary or of specialized interest,  
e.g., quick release reports, working  
papers, and bibliographies that contain 
minimal annotation. Does not contain 
extensive analysis. 
 
CONTRACTOR REPORT. Scientific and 
technical findings by NASA-sponsored 
contractors and grantees. 
CONFERENCE PUBLICATION.  
Collected papers from scientific and 
technical conferences, symposia, seminars, 
or other meetings sponsored or  
co-sponsored by NASA. 
 
SPECIAL PUBLICATION. Scientific, 
technical, or historical information from 
NASA programs, projects, and missions, 
often concerned with subjects having 
substantial public interest. 
 
TECHNICAL TRANSLATION.  
English-language translations of foreign 
scientific and technical material pertinent to  
NASA’s mission. 
 
Specialized services also include organizing  
and publishing research results, distributing 
specialized research announcements and 
feeds, providing information desk and personal 
search support, and enabling data exchange 
services. 
 
For more information about the NASA STI 
program, see the following: 
 
Access the NASA STI program home page 
at ​http://www.sti.nasa.gov 
 
E-mail your question to ​help@sti.nasa.gov 
 
Phone the NASA STI Information Desk at  
757-864-9658 
 
Write to: 
NASA STI Information Desk 
Mail Stop 148 
NASA Langley Research Center 
Hampton, VA 23681-2199 
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 Overview 
This report summarizes the performance of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Service 
Suppliers (USS) in the Technical Capability Level 4 (TCL4) flight test performed by NASA and 
its partners in support of the UAS Traffic Management (UTM) concept.  TCL4 is the final in a 
series of TCL demonstrations of a traffic management system for small UAS (sUAS).  All 
demonstrations have been executed in collaboration with industry partners. 
The [FAA 2018] UTM Concept of Operations document describes UTM as:  
 
...the manner in which the FAA will support operations for predominantly sUAS operating 
in low altitude airspace. UTM utilizes industry’s ability to supply services under FAA’s 
regulatory authority where these services do not currently exist. It is a community-based 
traffic management system, where the Operators are responsible for the coordination, 
execution, and management of operations, with rules of the road established by FAA. 
UTM is designed to support the demand and expectations for a broad spectrum of 
operations with ever-increasing complexity and risk. 
 
UTM should be considered a collection of services rather than a monolithic application.  The 
following section describes the architecture at a high level.  For further insight, the FAA’s 
concept document [FAA 2018] or NASA’s earlier concept publication [NASA 2016] should be 
consulted. 
UTM Operational Architecture 
The proposed system for managing small UAS at low altitude is much different than 
traditional air traffic management systems for conventional commercial airspace operations in 
the US.  Within UTM, the operations are managed collaboratively by a collection of USSs.  Each 
small UAS operation is managed by a USS to provide appropriate operational data to other 
USSs and to the operator.  These data exchanges are in support of the Concept of Operations 
for UTM and defined by a set of Application Programming Interfaces and the UAS Service 
Supplier Specification [Rios 2019b].  The Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) still maintains 
authority over the airspace, but certain services are delegated to the USSs so that the ANSP 
does not directly manage this class of operations in nominal cases.  This allows for scalability of 
the system and leverages industry’s ability to innovate and provide services.  There are other 
requirements that may be levied on the operator and the vehicles within UTM, but this paper 
focuses on the data exchange infrastructure of UTM. 
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Figure 1: UTM Application Programming Interfaces 
NASA UTM Data Collection Architecture 
The UTM data collection architecture is the result of lessons learned from previous TCLs as 
well as industry best-practices as applied to UTM testing.  There are two primary flows of data 
into NASA from the stakeholders involved in testing.  First there is the data exchanged as part 
of the operational concept.  These would include data such as operation plans, positions, and 
other UTM messages.  All of these data were collected live with a designated USS Data 
Collector (UDC) that interacts with the other USSs as if it were a USS.  The other flow of data 
originates from NASA’s Data Management Plan (DMP) for TCL4, and includes data that are 
used for research purposes and are not necessarily part of the UTM operational concept. 
These data would include elements such as latency measurements, vehicle logs, weather data, 
and others.  These data were submitted to the separate DMP system during or after testing. 
Both flows of data end up in a Universal Data Store (UDS). The UDS within this architecture 
provides a single source of truth for all TCL4 data, implementing a key architectural pattern in 
data collection and analysis.  UDS is used for all visualization and analysis of TCL4 testing data. 
Figure 2 summarizes this data collection architecture. 
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Figure 2.  TCL4 data management architecture. 
TCL4 Flight Test Summary 
The overall planning and execution of TCL4 will be described in a future NASA document.  A 
brief summary is provided here for context within the rest of the document. 
The TCL4 Demonstration was the final in a series of demonstrations by the NASA UTM 
Project.  Each demonstration from TCL1 to TCL4 increased in the number of system capabilities 
and the complexity of the operational environment.  Overall, the UTM Project sought to 
demonstrate in concert with the FAA and industry how UTM should work and to investigate 
areas in need of further research.  UTM is such a paradigm shift in how the airspace will be 
managed that often the correct questions to ask were not easily known in advance.  The TCL 
Demonstrations helped shape the architecture and concept of UTM and aided in the formulation 
of the requirements and gaps. 
TCL4 was executed at two of the FAA-designated UAS Test Sites:  Nevada and Texas, 
managed by the Nevada Institute for Autonomous Systems and Lone Star UAS Center of 
Excellence & Innovation, respectively.  Both sites were provided the same statement of work 
(SOW) and each developed a series of test plans to meet the SOW.  These plans were finalized 
in coordination with the NASA UTM Project. 
The test sites developed a team of partners to execute the flight testing.  These included 
USS providers, UAS equipment manufacturers, weather service providers, cellular service 
providers, radar providers, operators, public safety agencies, and others.  The SOW described 
five detailed scenarios with specific characteristics and test events that were considered the 
primary requirements of the flight test. 
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A key set of partners were the USS implementers.  This group represents key stakeholders 
in the future of the UTM System.  Given the primacy of the USSs in UTM, NASA developed a 
series of collaborative simulations and checkout exercises that each USS needed to complete 
successfully  in order to be allowed to participate in the TCL4 flight testing.  Some of this 
process is described in [Rios 2018] and [Rios 2018b].  This process also helped NASA inform 
potential future requirements related to USS Checkout procedures for a future operational UTM 
System [Smith 2019]. 
In the months leading up to the flight testing, the test sites worked with NASA to execute 
tabletop exercises, simulations, and shakeout flights to prepare for the actual field tests.  At 
each of these stages, the data collection approach was solidified to support the analysis that 
NASA needed to accomplish. 
 
Measures of Performance 
The NASA UTM Project defined twenty Measures of Performance (MOPs) to aid in 
quantification of the UTM System as designed and tested in TCL4.  Each of these MOPs will be 
reported internally to NASA.  Additionally, NASA will report on most of these MOPs in various 
venues in the future.  Three of the MOPs will be detailed in this report. 
The approach to defining MOPs is driven by NASA’s “NASA Systems Engineering 
Processes and Requirements” [NASA 2013].  Requirements for a system are supported by 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) which are qualitative in nature.  These MOEs are supported 
by MOPs which are quantitative in nature.  Formal definitions for requirements, MOEs, and 
MOPs are provided below.  These relationships are illustrated in ​Figure 1​. 
 
Figure 3.  Relationships of requirements, MOEs, and MOPs. 
 
The UTM System has several high-level requirements.  The formal definition of a 
requirement used within the UTM Project is defined as: 
 
The agreed upon need, capability, capacity, or demand for personnel, equipment, 
facilities, or other resources or services by specified quantities for specific periods of 
time or at a specified time expressed as a "shall" statement. Acceptable form for a 
requirement statement is individually clear, correct, feasible to obtain, unambiguous in 
meaning, and can be validated at the level of the system structure at which stated. In 
pairs of requirement statements or as a set, collectively, they are not redundant, are 
adequately related with respect to terms used, and are not in conflict with one another. 
 
Each MOP is connected to a defined Measure of Effectiveness (MOE).  An MOE is defined 
by NASA as: 
 
A measure by which a stakeholder's expectations will be judged in assessing 
satisfaction with products or systems produced and delivered in accordance with the 
associated technical effort. An MOE is deemed to be critical to not only the acceptability 
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 of the product by the stakeholder but also critical to operational/mission usage. An MOE 
is typically qualitative in nature or not able to be used directly as a "design-to" 
requirement. 
 
A MOP is defined by NASA [NASA 2013] as: 
 
A quantitative measure that, when met by the design solution, will help ensure that 
an MOE for a product or system will be satisfied. MOPs are given special attention 
during design to ensure that the MOEs with which they are associated are met. There 
are generally two or more measures of performance for each MOE. 
 
Requirement UTM-REQ-4 
The UTM System SHALL provide common situational awareness for stakeholders 
related to sUAS operations. 
 
This requirement, like the four others in the set of UTM’s first five requirements (not detailed 
here), is driven from the first Concept of Operations document published by NASA [NASA 
2016], which in turn was driven by stakeholder engagement across operators, regulators, 
researchers, pilots, and others. 
Measure of Effectiveness UTM-MOE-4 
UTM allows for common situational awareness of the airspace and operations within 
it to support sUAS operations. 
Summary of Measures of Performance 
The following table is a summary of the three MOPs reported in this document.  Further 
details provided in the subsequent subsections.  
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Table 1. Summary of MOPs reported in this document. 
MOP ID Title Description Minimum Success Target Success 
UTM-MOP-11 Successful response 
rate by USSs to 
unauthorized data 
exchanges 
The NASA USS 
submits 
intermittent 
requests to other 
USSs during TCL4 
with bad access 
tokens. 
> 90% appropriate 
response rate by 
USSs to access 
tokens 
100% appropriate 
response rate by 
USSs to access 
tokens 
UTM-MOP-13 USS latency within USS 
Network 
Calculate the 
average latency of 
USS exchanges, 
broken down by 
various categories. 
< 1000 ms average 
latency for data 
exchanges 
< 400 ms average 
latency for data 
exchanges 
UTM-MOP-16 Successful High Density 
Operations 
This MOP measures 
the number of (live 
and simulated) 
aircraft per defined 
0.2 nmi​2​ of UTM 
operations. 
> 10 aircraft (at 
least 3 live 
operations) 
airborne and 
managed by UTM 
for > 20 continuous 
minutes within 0.2 
nmi​2  
> 15 aircraft (at 
least 3 live 
operations) 
airborne and 
managed by UTM 
for > 20 continuous 
minutes within 0.2 
nmi​2 
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 Measure of Performance 11: Unauthorized Data Access 
UTM-MOP-11 is entitled “Successful response rate by USSs to unauthorized data 
exchanges.”  The high-level description is documented as “Using [NASA USS], submit 
intermittent requests to other USSs during TCL4 with bad access tokens.”  
This MOP aids in building confidence that data exchanges are appropriately authorized 
within the context of UTM.  Thus, the MOP supports UTM-MOE-4 by ensuring that the 
exchanged data are valid in building up common situational awareness.  Recall that these data 
exchanges between USSs describe operations, positions, and other operational data, which are 
the basis for a common operating picture. 
UTM-MOP-11 was conducted using a test driver leveraging the NASA USS (NUSS) using 
the USS-API.  NUSS was authenticated using the Flight Information Management System 
(FIMS) Authorization roles and authorizations.  The UTM-MOP-11 tests were automatically 
executed daily, at random times during the live Nevada and Texas Flight Tests.  Each day there 
were six different tests run against each USS, with the overall pass rate recorded for that USS. 
USSs were manually and directly notified of failures through an instant messaging service. 
Tests 
The six tests are described in the table below.  Each one tests a different way that 
operational data could be manipulated if the appropriate checks are not performed by the 
receiving USS.  These include trying to send messages about another USS’s operation to other 
USSs or a USS submitting spoofed position reports for an operation that it does not manage. 
The USS-under-test (UUT) must perform cross-checks between the access token and certain 
values of the data model and if they do not match the UUT must reject this message as 
forbidden.  As detailed in [Rios 2019], the cross-checks protect against several attacks including 
token re-use and USS spoofing.  The collection of the six tests will be referred to as the “test 
suite” and are summarized in Table 2.  The general data and action flow for each test is 
described in Figure 4.  The flow requires the test driver to setup initial valid data with the UUT 
and then attempt some illegitimate access or modification of those initial data, with the 
expectation that illegitimate access would be appropriately blocked by the UUT to pass the test. 
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 Table 2. Summary of the six tests (a.k.a the “test suite”) executed each run for UTM-MOP-11 
Test # Title Description 
1 Bad USS name in position 
report 
Given an existing operation supported by a USS, provide a 
position report with a valid token from that supporting USS.  The 
position report, however, has the uss_name field that is not for 
that USS. 
2 Spoof position report Given a valid operation supported by USS A, USS B submits a 
position report for that operation using an access token for USS B. 
3 Spoof operation plan USS A submits an operation with a valid token for USS A, however 
the uss_name in the operation plan is not USS A. 
4 Hijack operation management Given a valid operation supported by USS A, USS B attempts to 
submit an update to that operation with USS B as the uss_name 
and a valid token for USS B. 
5 Bad USS name in UTM 
Message 
USS A submits a UTM Message related to an operation managed 
by USS A, however the uss_name in the UTM Message is not USS 
A. 
6 Spoof UTM Message Given a valid operation supported by USS A, USS B submits a UTM 
Message related to that operation using an access token for USS 
B. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. General flow for a single test for UTM-MOP-11. 
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Results 
Figure 5 shows that of the 162 test suite runs, 144 times the UUT passed all six tests in the 
test suite.  The next largest cluster of results shows that the UUT failed the entire test suite, but 
that only occurred thirteen times. These failures were likely caused by deployment regressions. 
The process of developing a web service application includes developing the source code and 
building the artifact, then deploying the artifact, typically to cloud.  Network boundary services at 
the layer directly exposed to the Internet handle routing, load balancing and various security 
operational controls.  Typically these network boundary services are maintained by separate 
network personnel, not by the application developers.  During TCL4 testing, problems in this 
layer contributed to regressions. 
 
Figure 5: Performance of USSs each time the test suite was run. 
 
Figure 6 shows UTM-MOP-11 results for each USS during flight testing.  Each USS was 
tested once for each operational flight day between June 17, 2019 and August 8, 2019 for a 
total of 497 data points.  The failures of “USS D” occurred during flight testing at Texas after 
“USS D” was completely successful during flight testing in Nevada.  The regression was not 
completely explained and there was insufficient time to make the fix to USS D system thus 
repeated failures were detected.  Failures in USS I were erratic and could have been caused by 
a problem in the network boundary layer such as a “sticky cache.”  USS I could have corrected 
the problem had it been notified of the failure, however at the time of testing, the test framework 
did not have automated, per-USS test report delivery.  NASA’s automation solution was 
implemented in another framework but not MOPS-11 framework.  
13 
 Figure 6: Results of testing authorization implementation of each USS during flight testing. 
 
UTM-MOP-11 established a minimum success bar of 90%.  On a per-USS view, 5 of the 7 
USSs met the minimum success criterion.  Aggregating all test results for all flight days across 
all USSs, the result was a 89.70% pass rate, failing to achieve the overall minimum success 
criteria. 
 
Figure 7: Formula for percentage of successful tests. 
Discussion 
There are several key takeaway messages from the data collection and analysis related to 
UTM-MOP-11.  This section will list and provide discussion on each. 
 
All or Nothing Results 
 The results tended to be “all or nothing,” either completely succeeded or failed.  When 
NASA notified a USS of its failure status, those USSs were provided full insight to the failures 
from NASA’s perspective.  Most of the USSs that participated in Nevada also participated in 
Texas, therefore the USSs as a group were able to reduce overall regressions over the course 
of TCL4.  Despite a large gap between the full success (144 instances) on each test suite run 
and the full failure (13 instances), those two groups represent nearly all of the results, excluding 
just 5 of the overall results.  This result points to failures in this security implementation being 
wider than just a single coding error on a particular aspect of the service.  As noted above, this 
14 
 likely had more to do with whether infrastructure failures at various layers of a USS’s 
architecture were automatically discovered and reported.  This is typical in industry and 
government collaboration efforts where the management of the network and the applications 
may involve completely separate  personnel with completely different operating objectives. 
 
Test Automation 
The TCL4 Demonstration helped NASA further define efficient methods for testing USSs. 
For the most complete assessment of USS test data, ideally, the testing process would be fully 
automated, including scheduling, executing, capturing results, writing generous log data, and 
automatically pushing the results to the UUT.  Note that because NASA need to push the report 
package securely, the automatic reporting required coordinating credentials, and therefore not 
all tests were instrumented with automatic reporting. Some delays in USSs addressing their 
failures and regressions resulted in delayed notification of failures. 
As noted above, if the USS under test fails to perform cross-checks between the security 
token and the data payload, a security threat is no longer mitigated.  During a live test flight 
which uses prescribed data and scenarios, almost all of the data exchanges are expected to 
return OK and none are expected to return “Forbidden.”  This illustrates the benefit of running 
separate automated tests concurrently with the flight tests, as these provide quality of service 
data, in addition to the functional and performance data provided by the flight tests. 
These observations point to the need to monitor and automatically report failures to the USS 
to protect against regressions in the dynamic deployment processes of modern software.  To 
support this objective, considerations for requirements related to software updates would also 
be reasonable. 
 
Bad Apples 
Having one or two stakeholders fail to meet security criteria for the system will have an 
impact on the overall security of the system.  This illustrates the need for compliance by all 
USSs in an operational system, else cracks in the implementation will diminish the overall trust 
and security of the system. 
 
Ordering of Checks 
The USS Specification requires validation checks but does not prescribe in what order they 
are implemented. Depending on the order the checks were implemented by the UUT, more than 
one response is received by NASA.  For example, if the USS implemented a time format 
validation check to occur before the token ‘sub’ claim check, the response error code would be 
“Invalid Data” (HTTP Response Code 400).  However, if the order of these checks are reversed 
the response would be something like "Message USS name does not match the token sub” 
(HTTP Response Code 401).  During our testing process we discussed this condition with our 
partners and in some cases adjusted our tests to be more flexible.  
For an operational system, the ordering of checks needs to be formally defined to ensure 
interoperability.  TCL 4 provides valuable lessons learned on how to prescribe ordering.  Both 
the network technology stack and the data elements under inspection need to be considered. 
Future USS interfaces will likely contain different network connection technologies such as 
streaming data endpoints. For example, websockets are based on a stateful connection, where 
authentication and authorization is done once at the connection step, in contrast to RESTFul 
which authorizes each data exchange.  Authorization checks require inspection of several data 
elements.  Some checks inspect only the security context, others require cross-checking 
between the security context and the data payload and finally some checks require 
15 
 cross-checking of data from a prior data exchange that is likely stored in the application’s 
persistence service.   Checks requiring persisted data would need to be performed last. 
 
  
16 
 Measure of Performance 13: USS Latency 
UTM-MOP-13 is entitled “USS latency within USS Network.”  The high-level description is 
documented as “Calculate the average latency of USS exchanges, broken down by various 
categories.”  The UTM Project established a minimum success criteria of an average latency of 
< 1000ms and a target success of < 400ms for various data exchanges. 
This MOP provides insight into the timeliness of data exchanged within the USS Network. 
Thus, it directly supports UTM-MOE-4 by ensuring that the exchanged data are timely and 
actionable by the USSs and the other stakeholders those USSs support. 
All USSs were required to log the latency to complete the primary USS-USS data 
exchanges.  These exchanges were broken into the following categories and logged as such by 
the USSs: 
 
● Discovery:  Data exchanges with the underlying USS Discovery system 
● UTM Messages:  Messages regarding Operations 
● Positions:  Reports of Positions from USS to USS 
● Operations:  Operation plans shared from USS to USS 
● Negotiation Messages:  Messages related to strategic deconfliction of Operations 
 
The following subsections examine various aspects of these USS Exchange messages, 
culminating in a report on UTM-MOP-13. 
 
Data Model 
Each USS logged data exchanges with other USSs and the underlying USS Discovery 
system. The UTM System does not impose requirements on the structure of those logs. 
However, for NASA TCL4 testing, a unified model for reporting information about exchanges 
between USSs was required.  For each exchange of Operation, Position, UTM Message, 
Negotiation Message, or Discovery data, each USS was required to submit an instance of the 
USSExchange data model.  This model was part of the overall Data Management Plan for the 
participating stakeholders and was documented (amongst other ways) as an API published on 
GitHub . 1
The model collects elements such as the source USS, the target USS, the reporting USS 
(which must be either the source or target USS), HTTP response, data type exchanged, time 
initiated, time completed, and other related elements. 
 
Data Scrubbing 
There were a total of 1,149,926 USS Exchange data samples collected from USSs during 
TCL4 operational flight tests.  Note that there were additional samples (over 2 million total) 
collected during testing and shakeout events, which are not included in this analysis.  Some of 
the samples are specifically excluded from the analysis below.  These exclusions were due to 
three separate sources of error: 
 
1. Outlier latency 
2. Target system latency 
1 ​UTM API Documentation on GitHub​, as of October 2019. 
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 3. Invalid data submission 
 
The first condition, outlier latencies, was applied  to allow for reasonable averages to be 
computed.  As a reasonable cutoff, all data exchanges taking over 5 minutes were excluded; 33 
of the 1,149,926 (< 0.003%) samples fell into this category.  Typically these samples were from 
the automated servers logging exchanges with downed or unavailable servers, so the ultimate 
HTTP status code would be of the 50X-type (server error).  The HTTP timeout for USS 
exchanges was not specified in TCL4 testing, so USSs used various values for waiting for 
responses from other servers. 
The second condition, target system latency, was applied to address two concerns.  First, 
there were few samples (25,330) relative to the overall data set of more than 1.1 million (~2.2% 
of all samples), which raised the possibility of selection or reporting bias in the data.  Second, 
the latency for a target server is embedded in the latency report for a source server.  This is 
because the latency of a request from a source server as reported in the USS Exchange model 
is the sum of transport latency to the target server, processing time of the target server, and the 
transport latency back to the source server.  Thus, the target latencies would generally be lower 
than the source latencies and would actually be “double counted” if reporting was complete and 
consistent. 
The third and final condition involved corrupted data submitted by a particular USS.  The 
error was introduced through the serialization and deserialization process of timestamps.  In that 
process, some information was lost due to mis-implementation of the API specification.  There 
were 30,850 samples, or 2.7% of all samples, in this category.  With over 95% of all data still 
available for analysis covering 6 other USSs involved in TCL4 flight testing, it was determined to 
be reasonable to ignore these samples rather than manually correcting the data. 
Some of the scrubbed data occurred  in both the second and third conditions, i.e. both 
submitted as a target USS and from the mis-submitting USS.  Thus overall, there were 49,633 
of the 1,149,926 samples excluded, or ~4.3% of the collected data.  The breakdown of excluded 
data are illustrated in Figure 5 as a Venn diagram. 
 
Figure 8. Data samples specifically excluded from analysis due to known conditions producing 
errors that affected  ~4.3% of samples. 
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 Simulated Versus Live Operations 
The data analysis includes USS exchanges related to both live and simulated operations 
during TCL4.  From the perspective of USS to USS data exchanges, there is no difference 
between a simulated operation and a live operation, thus the latencies are equally valid.  This is 
due to the fact that all USSs are remotely-served systems, likely all cloud-based.  The measured 
latencies are between these systems, and it does not matter what triggers the data exchange 
(i.e. a live or simulated event).  For other operational data analysis, it would be reasonable to 
separate the classes of operations.  However, there were more simulated operations than live 
operations in TCL4; one potential impact to analysis would be if a USS that handled more 
simulated operations had skewed latency values for any reason.   This situation is addressed 
below to some degree. 
Message Count and Latency 
Due to the type of data and the requirements for data exchange with the TCL4 UTM System, 
there was wide variation in the quantity and latency of data exchanges of each type, which are 
illustrated in Figure 9.  A takeaway from this graph, which will be discussed in more depth in the 
Discussion section below, is that the message type with the highest latency (Negotiations) was 
used much less frequently than the most common data exchange (Positions), which has a 
relatively low latency.  Note that the latencies presented here are as measured by the 
requesting system, thus the measurements represent total latency from request to response 
from the requestor’s perspective. 
 
 
Figure 9.  95th Percentile latency values and number of samples by message type. 
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 Per USS Performance 
The samples were dominated by a single USS that diligently recorded and reported its data 
calls to other USSs.  Together with the USS that submitted bad data, another USS was 
excluded since it submitted data as a target USS exclusively, which met the exclusion criteria 
as discussed above.  Thus, the data analysis is based on samples from 4 distinct USSs.  To 
ensure that the large portion of data submitted by a single USS did not overly skew the data, the 
median latencies for each of the 4 USSs was compared (Table 3). 
 
Table 3.  Samples and median latency per USS. 
 USS 1 USS 2 USS 3 USS 4 
Samples 220,720 23,460 844,061 12,052 
Median Latency (ms) 82 115 83 104 
 
Since the two dominantly-represented USSs have similar median latency values, the 
analysis was performed with the assumption that there was not an obvious bias due to the large 
sample set from a single USS.  A deeper analysis may provide further insight, but is not 
presented here. 
UTM-MOP-13 
As mentioned above, this MOP is defined as “Calculate the average latency of USS 
exchanges, broken down by various categories.”  The UTM Project established a minimum 
success criteria of an average latency of < 1000ms and a target success of < 400ms for various 
data exchanges.  The results are presented in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10. UTM-MOP-13 results for average latency for USS data exchanges. 
 
Over the full set of messages, this MOP was met, with an overall average latency of 189.4 
ms.  When broken down by message type, the minimum success criteria were met for all but the 
Negotiation message type.  Variability was high amongst most message types (over 2 seconds 
of standard deviation for Operation, Negotiation, and UTM_Message exchanges), with tighter 
standard deviation on Position and Discovery messages (623 ms and 110 ms, respectively). 
Another view of the data is provided via the cumulative distribution of all samples, for all 
message types,  illustrated in Figure 11.  This plot shows that 95% of all data exchanges occur 
with 531ms or less latency.  As with the average values presented in Figure 10, the 95th 
percentile latency changes with message type.  To illustrate, note Figures 12 and 13 showing 
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 the cumulative distributions for Position and Negotiation messages, respectively.  The 95th 
percentile for Position messages is 471 ms, while it is 3,908 ms for Negotiation messages. 
 
 
Figure 11. UTM-MOP-13 results for average latency for USS data exchanges. 
 
 
Figure 12. Cumulative distribution of sampled latencies for Position messages. 
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Figure 13. Cumulative distribution of sampled latencies for Negotiation messages. 
 
Discussion 
There are several key takeaway messages from the data collection and analysis related to 
UTM-MOP-13.  This section will list and provide discussion on each. 
 
Varied Performance Per Message Type 
There was wide latency variation across message types.  This finding makes it difficult to 
state a blanket “good” latency for data exchanges between USSs.  The implication is that any 
future performance specifications for USS communications needs to take into consideration the 
type of data being exchanged when establishing performance requirements.  Otherwise, a 
lowest common denominator approach will place inappropriate performance requirements on 
potentially low-latency exchanges.  The extra latency for certain message types derives from 
the potential processing that a USS must perform on the message to provide a response.  For 
example, for a negotiation message, there may be several latent or expensive computations 
that must be performed to generate the appropriate response.  On the other hand, a position 
message requires virtually no processing by the receiving USS before an appropriate response 
can be provided, thus the wide variation in observed latency by the source USS. 
 
Minimal Operational Impact Due to Latency 
A subjective, qualitative observation from TCL4 flight testing is that there was little impact to 
operations due to the latency of data exchanges between USSs.  There was negative impact 
observed due to downed servers, inappropriately high http-request rates, or misimplemented 
specifications, but not purely to latency of data exchanges.  The implication is that USS-USS 
communications will not likely be a bottleneck to the implementation of an operational UTM 
System.  It is also useful to note that the implementations of USSs for TCL4 were not 
necessarily hardened or tuned for true operational use, thus there is likely further room for 
reasonable performance enhancement where needed. 
 
Streaming Interface 
In the course of UTM development, NASA and partners often discussed implementing 
Position reporting use cases over a streaming endpoint such as websockets.  During TCL2 and 
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 -3 partner testing, NASA evaluated the position reporting use cases and decided to bypass 
streaming implementations until UTM concepts and the USS Specification matured. This 
strategy of using one simple, uniform interface technology (REST using JSON-over-HTTP) 
helped NASA and their partners maintain continuous progress in developing UTM.  Thus all 
participants were able to focus on data models and protocols instead of additional development 
considerations and deployment issues. The work presented here should function as a 
performance benchmark upon which further design decisions can be implemented and 
measured. 
 
Viable Initial Model for Communication Performance 
The data for this analysis were collected using a specified model for TCL4.  This model may 
also prove useful in an operational UTM System.  There will likely be reporting requirements for 
USSs to the regulator and/or ANSP which may be related to incident investigations, 
service-level monitoring, or other aspects of the UTM System.  The standardization of the data 
formatting for issues related to USS-USS communications will be important for rapid analysis, 
consistent requirements, and compliance reporting across USSs.  The USSExchange model 
should be considered a benchmark from which the UTM industry stakeholders and regulators 
can tune to operational requirements. 
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 Measure of Performance 16: High-Density Operations 
UTM-MOP-16 is entitled “Successful High-Density Operations.”  The high-level description is 
documented as “This MOP measures the number of (live and simulated) aircraft per defined 0.2 
nmi​2​ of UTM operations.”  The original minimum success criteria as underspecified as “> 10.” 
For this analysis, the minimum success criteria was more precisely defined as “> 10 aircraft (at 
least 3 live operations) airborne and managed by UTM within an area of 0.2 nmi​2​.” Similarly the 
original target success criteria was further detailed to become: “> 15 aircraft (at least 3 live 
operations) airborne and managed by UTM within an area of 0.2 nmi​2​.” 
In some cases, the requirement as written in the Statement of Work to the Test Site was 
more stringent in order to push the limits on subsystem capabilities.  For example, in one 
scenario, NASA defined a requirement for > 90% of the operational time to be spent in a 
high-density condition of > 10 aircraft per 0.2 nmi​2​, which could amount to nearly an hour spent 
in that condition, depending on scenario execution time. 
Density Calculation 
The parameter of 0.2 nmi​2​ was derived qualitatively based on range size, subject-matter 
expert input, and ease of translation between units.  Many of the underlying calculations are 
performed in meters and then converted to feet or nmi.  The value of 0.2 nmi​2​ is roughly 
equivalent to 720 m​2​ or a circle with radius 406m.  For all calculations in this paper, a circle with 
406m radius was used to calculate density. 
Given that the operations are dynamic, it is not feasible to determine a static “center point” 
for calculating density.  It is possible to pre-define a grid of the desired dimensions, but 
operations could be densely packed separated by a static grid line, reducing the actual density 
calculation, since operations could be split into different static grid cells.  Even if NASA 
attempted to use the planned operational locations to determine a reasonable center point, the 
calculations would be affected by last-minute operational decisions to ground certain operations 
or move their operating areas.  Therefore,  NASA implemented the following  data-driven 
approach to determining a center from which to calculate density. 
After collecting all current positions for all active operations at any given time, a density 
center was calculated using a geometric median.  The geometric median is the point that 
minimizes the sum of the distances to the points in the collection.  This is preferred for this use 
case over a center of mass calculation as outliers can inordinately affect the center of mass 
calculation, whereas the geometric median finds the largest grouping more often.  Also, the 
geometric median is shown to be robust to errors within the source data, still providing a good 
estimate of the median when up to half the source positions are corrupted .  This approach 2
could be affected by an evenly divided pair of equally sized groups of points, but this is unlikely 
and was not experienced in TCL4.  NASA leveraged a Geographic Information System (GIS) 
capable relational database (Postgres with the PostGIS extension), which has an 
implementation of geometric median.  The ST_GeometricMedian function in PostGIS 
implements an approach described in [Weiszfeld] (with an English translation available by 
[Plastria]).  Pseudocode is provided in Figure 14, with the efficient implementation being 
provided by Postgres and PostGIS, thus the actual geometric calculations are not necessarily 
“for loops” as presented in the pseudocode, but the concept is consistent. 
  
2 The data for this calculation shows no signs of corruption, but given some natural uncertainties in 
position measurement, the calculation robustness is a nice feature. 
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for​ each time t ​in​ scenario s 
 
for​ each operation, o, ​in​ scenario s 
if​ o is active 
add most recent position of o to positions collection, P 
fi 
done​ ​for​ each operation 
 
calculate geometric median, ​med ​, of P 
 
for​ each position, ​pos ​, ​in​ P 
if​ ​pos ​ is within 406m of ​med 
add ​pos ​ to positions collection, Q 
fi 
done​ ​for​ each position 
 
return​ size of Q as current density at time t 
 
end ​for 
Figure 14.  Pseudocode for calculation of the density values. 
Data Model 
The primary data model for the calculation of this MOP was the Position model.  An instance 
of this model is provided by each USS for each of their operations at a rate of 1Hz.  This is 
considered an “operational” data model as it is expected to be used (in its current form or some 
related form) for a future operational system.  These position reports were received by a 
NASA-deployed testing artifact within the TCL4 environment called the USS Data Collector or 
UDC.  UDC implemented the USS API and, thus, interacted with other USSs during the test as if 
it were another USS.  However its primary purpose was to collect USS-USS communication 
data as it occurred.  UDC performed other functions related to data validation, data 
visualization, and related functions that will not be detailed here. 
Results 
Each test site had several runs of the five scenarios developed by NASA.  Each run at each 
test site was given an identifier by test site, scenario, and run.  The goal of UTM-MOP-16 was 
not to maximize density of operations for every run, as each scenario had different 
requirements.  However, most good  runs reached the minimum density and many runs met the 3
target density value.  Figure 15 shows the maximum achieved density from several runs of 
3 The “goodness” of a run was qualitative in nature as determined by the NASA UTM flight test team. 
This qualitative assessment was supported by live data and reports from the field.  A “not good” run may 
have experienced technical difficulty with multiple live vehicles or USSs, for example.  This would be 
visible in the collected data in the form of missing operations. 
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 multiple scenarios from both test sites.
 
Figure 15.  Maximum density across a sampling of  scenarios, both test sites, and many runs. 
 
For Run 2021 of Scenario 4 (S4R2021) from Nevada flight testing, further analysis is 
illuminating.  Scenario 4 required the simulation of a large-scale loss of communications.  For 
example, if most or all operators relied upon the cellular network and there was a catastrophic 
loss of this service for some reason, then all operations would need to execute contingencies 
and attempt to land.  In this run, there were at most two live operations active at any time.  The 
large number of simulated operations are the primary reason that this run was able to maintain 
a consistent level of density, with a summary provided in Table 4. However this run did not 
reach the threshold of three for live operation count. 
 
Figure 16. S4R2021 Density of operations with simulated large-scale loss of communications. 
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Figure 17 . S4R2021 at 16:31 with 14 simulated and 2 live operations (airplane symbol) within 4
406m of density center (black marker, obscured) in downtown Reno. 
 
 
Table 4.  S4R2021 and UTM-MOP-16 target goals for density. 
 Density >= 10 Density >= 15 
% Operational Time 83.30% 26.19% 
Total Mins 67.3 21.2 
 
 
For Run 4013 of Scenario 4 (S4R4013) in Corpus Christi, Texas, the minimum success 
density was achieved for a short period.  In this case, there were five live operations involved at 
the time of peak density (12 operations within 0.2nm​2​).  Figure 19 shows one of the peaks in 
density (at 16:00 UTC).  There were additional simulated operations occurring at that time in 
downtown Corpus Christi, indicated by the orange markers in Figure 19.  Those operations are 
not included in the density count due to their distance from the calculated median point of all of 
the operations, indicated with the black marker in Figure 19. 
 
 
4 Underlying map data is © OpenStreetMap contributors.  ​https://www.openstreetmap.org/copyright​.  
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Figure 18. S4R2021 Density of operations with simulated large-scale loss of communications. 
 
 
Figure 19. S4R4013 at 16:00 with 7 simulated and 5 live operations (airplane symbol) within 
406m of density center (black marker) in Corpus Christi.  Other simulated operations at that time 
away from the density center indicated in orange. 
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Table 5.  S4R4013 and UTM-MOP-16 target goals for density. 
 Density >= 10 Density >= 15 
% Operational Time 10.80% 0.00% 
Total Mins 3.2 0.0 
 
Discussion 
There are several key takeaway messages from the data collection and analysis related to 
UTM-MOP-16.  This section will list and provide discussion on each. 
 
Viable Architecture 
Overall, this measure of performance indicates that a reasonable volume of small UAS traffic 
can be handled by the proposed UTM architecture, which meets the needs of many identified 
UTM use cases.  There are still open questions about scalability that were not directly 
addressed, for example having this density of operations in several locations in a given city 
would require appropriately scaled infrastructure.  However, it will be some time before much 
higher densities from those tested in TCL4 will become a safe reality.  Thus the scalability 
issues can be addressed in the meantime with no major architectural blockers for reaching 
reasonable densities.  There are also still protocol issues related to negotiation and emergency 
procedures, but, again, the architecture is amenable to scaling operations. 
 
Operational Orchestration 
Target densities were often missed in a given run due to orchestrating multiple stakeholders, 
platforms, and software systems.  While this outcome impacted running a flight test as planned, 
it did not directly provide data on the ability of an operational system to handle diverse 
stakeholders in a UTM environment.  
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Overall Discussion 
The analysis of the three MOPs presented in this document resulted in  a number of 
insights, summarized in the following table. 
 
Table 6.  Summary of lessons and insights from USS network performance testing. 
MOP Lesson/Insight Summary 
UTM-MOP-11 All or Nothing Results For certain requirements and tests, there are likely 
interdependencies introduced via the deployment process of the 
software.  This may cause test failures to occur in sets.  
UTM-MOP-11 Testing Automation Efficient, continuous testing approaches for USSs are possible 
and likely necessary for an operational UTM System. 
UTM-MOP-11 Bad Apples With respect to security, a single, poorly-implemented USS will 
diminish trust and security in the overall system.  Compliance 
and compliance monitoring of security implementations will be 
of high importance in an operational UTM System. 
UTM-MOP-11 Ordering of Checks USSs checked various security and message requirements in 
different orders, thus impacting interoperability.  Ordering of 
required checks needs formalization for an operational system. 
UTM-MOP-13 Varied Performance Per 
Message Type 
Performance and QoS requirements likely need to be tailored for 
each type of data exchange. 
UTM-MOP-13 Minimal Operational 
Impact Due to Latency 
In general, there were not any observable impacts to active 
operations due to USS data exchanges. 
UTM-MOP-13 Streaming Interface In UTM TCL4, a design decision in favor of development velocity 
over data exchange efficiency was made early in development. 
It is appropriate to use the results of this flight test to reexamine 
the types of communication interfaces between USSs to 
potentially include streaming data. 
UTM-MOP-13 Viable Initial Model for 
Communication 
Performance 
The approach to collecting USS communication performance 
data may be relevant to logging and auditing requirements in an 
operational UTM System. 
UTM-MOP-16 Viable Architecture Testing indicates that a reasonable volume of small UAS traffic 
can be handled by the proposed UTM architecture.  
UTM-MOP-16 Operational Orchestration Target densities were often missed in a given run due to 
orchestrating multiple stakeholders, platforms, and software 
systems.  While this has an impact on running a flight test as 
planned, it does not directly comment on the ability of an 
operational system to handle diverse stakeholders in a UTM 
environment. 
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 The MOPs for USS Network performance provide insight into how a future operational UTM 
System may operate in a secure and responsive manner to handle a volume of traffic 
reasonable for the near future.  With further work on scalability and the design of protocols, the 
architecture is likely amenable to denser and more complex operational densities. 
The results of the NASA UTM Project are being transferred to the FAA via a Research 
Transition Team.  Some findings are also being transferred to industry via standards bodies and 
publications such as this one.  NASA plans to continue research on UTM.  This includes 
graduating concepts and architectures to other aviation domains such as Urban Air Mobility 
(UAM), high altitude operations (over 60,000 ft), and space traffic management.  Thus, the 
results from UTM testing will likely have broad impact on future aerospace applications. 
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